USA v. Michael Katzin by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-8-2017 
USA v. Michael Katzin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Michael Katzin" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 885. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/885 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-3264 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL KATZIN, 
 
                                                 Appellant  
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(Civ. Action No. 5-11-cr-00226-002) 
District Judge: Honorable Gene E. K. Pratter 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 14, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 8, 2017) 
______________ 
 
OPINION*  
______________ 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Michael Katzin was convicted at trial of four federal offenses: 1) conspiracy to 
commit pharmacy burglary, 18 U.S.C. § 2118(d); 2) conspiracy to possess with intent to 
distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. § 846; 3) pharmacy burglary, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2118(b); and 4) possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841.  In this appeal, he now raises three claims.  First, he challenges his indictment and 
conviction on the two conspiracy counts.  Second, he argues that his expert testimony 
should not have been excluded.  Third, he challenges the application of a sentencing 
enhancement for obstruction of justice.  We will affirm.   
I. BACKGROUND 
 Because this case has already been partially litigated in this Court, we recite only 
those additional facts necessary for this appeal.  Michael Katzin and his brothers were 
pulled over and then arrested after burglarizing a Rite Aid in Hamburg, Pennsylvania.  
They were apprehended through the use of GPS tracking, raising Fourth Amendment 
issues that were eventually resolved by this Court, sitting en banc, 769 F.3d 163 (2014).  
When stopped, Michael Katzin was a passenger in the car.  The vehicle contained items 
from the Rite Aid as well as burglary tools connected to the break-in.   
 After the GPS issues were finally resolved, Katzin’s brothers reached plea 
agreements with the government.  Michael, however, pled not guilty to the original two-
count indictment, including both non-conspiracy charges, and proceeded to trial. 
 Two pretrial issues are relevant to this appeal.  First, the government filed a 
motion to admit evidence of past acts, including what the government characterized as an 
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earlier attempted burglary in Feasterville-Trevose, Pennsylvania, pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 404(b).  Before the District Court could rule on that motion, however, a 
superseding indictment was returned, adding the two conspiracy charges against Katzin.  
At that point, the District Court determined that the evidence about the Feasterville 
incident was intrinsic to the conspiracy charges, not evidence of other bad acts governed 
by Rule 404, and therefore admissible.  The defense also tried to exclude the Feasterville 
incident from trial by moving to strike allegations concerning that incident from the 
superseding indictment. 
Second, shortly before trial, the defense sought to introduce expert testimony 
supporting Katzin’s claim that he had slept through the Hamburg burglary due to a large 
dose of Xanax.  Katzin’s alleged intoxication was not mentioned at the time of arrest—
indeed, at that point, Katzin spoke with police, who did not observe him to be 
intoxicated—or in the years of pretrial proceedings.  On December 28, 2015, the defense 
notified the government that it would introduce a medical expert, Dr. John O’Brien, to 
testify about Katzin’s addiction to opiates and benzodiazepines and his mental capacity at 
the relevant time.  The defense served its expert report on the government on December 
31, 2015, eight days before trial commenced on January 8, 2016.   
 The government objected to this expert evidence on both substantive evidentiary 
grounds, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 704(b) and 403, and on procedural 
grounds, pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 12.2 and 16.  The District 
Court partially excluded the evidence on substantive grounds, holding that Dr. O’Brien 
could not testify to the ultimate issue of Katzin’s mens rea and that hearsay elements of 
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O’Briens’s report were more prejudicial than probative.  The District Court then excluded 
all of the expert evidence on procedural grounds.  It observed that Rule 12.2 requires the 
defense to notify the prosecution and the court of an intention to introduce expert 
evidence related to a mental condition bearing on the issue of guilt within the time set for 
filing pretrial motions (Rule 16, it noted, imposes similar disclosure obligations).  
Because the original deadline for pretrial motions had been set for August 12, 2011, with 
a second deadline after the Fourth Amendment appellate proceedings were complete set 
for August 7, 2015, the District Court ruled the defense’s disclosure untimely and 
excluded the evidence.   
 The case proceeded to trial, where, among other things, Michael Katzin took the 
stand.  He testified that on the night of the Hamburg burglary, he joined his brothers to 
get something eat.  Because he had swallowed a handful of Xanax, he testified, he 
promptly fell asleep, awakening only long enough to take more pills until he was 
arrested.  According to Katzin, he was “sleeping in the car the whole time.”  App. 1026a.  
The jury ultimately convicted on all four counts.   
 After trial, the probation office recommended adding two levels to Katzin’s 
offense level for obstruction of justice based on perjurious testimony at trial, including 
his professed lack of knowledge about the burglary.  The defense objected, and a 
colloquy ensued during which the parties presented their positions on perjury and during 
which the Court explored whether and how Katzin’s untimely disclosures affected a 
finding of obstruction of justice.  In the end, the Court applied the adjustment because 
“the defendant has, for whatever reason, essentially tweaked his nose at the justice 
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system and has shown a lack of respect for it and its administration and the jury and the 
Court and did obstruct the operation of justice both during the pretrial proceedings and 
then at trial.”  App. 1295a.   
II. JURISDICTION 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this criminal proceeding pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
III. THE CONSPIRACY CLAIMS 
 The defense challenges Katzin’s convictions on the two conspiracy counts for 
three reasons.  It asserts that 1) the conspiracy allegations should have been struck from 
the indictment, 2) the government had an improper motivation for adding the conspiracy 
counts in its superseding indictment, and 3) there was not sufficient evidence to convict.1  
We address each in turn and will affirm.  
III.A Sufficiency of the Evidence before the Grand Jury 
 The defense first argues that the District Court “should have stricken the 
conspiracy counts from the Superseding Indictment because there was insufficient 
evidence presented to the grand jury to establish criminality or wrongdoing.”  Appellant’s 
Br. at 24.  When reviewing a motion to dismiss an indictment, we “exercise plenary 
                                              
1 To the extent that Katzin also claims that this evidence was prejudicial, which we do not 
think he argues as an independent claim, we find this argument waived on appeal, as it is 
not meaningfully pressed in his brief.  See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (noting that it is “well settled that an appellant's failure to identify or argue an 
issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal”). 
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review over the District Court's legal conclusions and review any challenges to its factual 
findings for clear error.”  United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 594 (3d Cir. 2012). 
As we have held, an “indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased 
grand jury, . . . if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits.”  
Id. at 594-95 (quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956)) (emphasis 
omitted).  Generally, an indictment will be facially sufficient if it “informs the defendant 
of the statute he is charged with violating, lists the elements of a violation under the 
statute, and specifies the time period during which the violations occurred.”  Id. at 595. 
 The defense bases its argument that the court should inquire into the sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting the indictment on a single district court case: United States v. 
Wolff, 840 F. Supp. 322 (M.D. Pa. 1993).  Although that case did delve into the 
sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, it declared its own (already non-
precedential) holding “limited to the unusual circumstances of the case.”  Id. at 325.  In 
that contempt proceeding, the court was presented with no disputed facts, only with a 
legal question concerning the interpretation of that court’s own order.  Id.  Wolff has no 
applicability here.  Accordingly, this argument provides no basis for us to reverse the 
District Court’s decision or to depart from our ordinary approach to the sufficiency of an 
indictment.  See United States v. Centeno, 793 F.3d 378, 388 n.9 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(arguments “not squarely argued” on appeal are waived).   
III.B The Motivations behind the Indictment 
 Although he cites no law to support his theory, Katzin complains that his 
indictment was improper because it was motivated by the prosecution’s desire to evade 
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the strictures of Rule 404 by transforming past acts evidence into intrinsic evidence of a 
conspiracy.  Katzin’s claim could, perhaps, be framed as challenging a retaliatory 
charging in response to his efforts to exclude improper past acts testimony.  Without the 
benefit of Katzin’s own legal theory, we analyze his claim under the framework of 
prosecutorial vindictiveness, which prevents a person from being “punished for 
exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.”  United States v. Goodwin, 457 
U.S. 368, 372 (1982).   
However, in a pretrial context, the Supreme Court has explained that “[a]n initial 
[prosecutorial] decision should not freeze future conduct” and that a “prosecutor should 
remain free before trial to exercise the broad discretion entrusted to him to determine the 
extent of the societal interest in prosecution.”  Id. at 382.  Thus, in the absence of “actual 
vindictiveness,” which requires evidence that the charging decision resulted “solely” 
from the defendant’s exercise of a legal right, a prosecutor is permitted to add charges to 
an indictment.  See United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1221 (3d Cir. 1993).  Katzin 
does not point to any such evidence.   
III.C Sufficiency of the Evidence at Trial 
 We review the sufficiency of the evidence under a “particularly deferential 
standard,” reviewing the record “in the light most favorable to the prosecution to 
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt[ ] beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 
2013) (en banc) (alteration in original).  A verdict must be upheld “as long as it does not 
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fall below the threshold of bare rationality.”  Id. at 431 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 Here, that standard is satisfied.  With respect to the Feasterville incident, evidence 
showed that Katzin, Harry, and a third individual were found behind a shopping center 
late at night, with tools that could be used for burglary.  The store’s alarm system had 
also been disabled, although it is not clear when this occurred.  Viewing this evidence in 
combination with the strong evidence of the completed burglary in Hamburg—including 
the items taken from the Rite Aid and physical evidence connecting the entry tools to the 
defendants—a reasonable jury could determine that the Feasterville incident was part of 
the same conspiracy.  This is all the more so given that these were the same individuals, 
in the same vehicle, with similar tools, at the same time of night.  We also note, as the 
District Court did, that “the overt acts necessary to establish a conspiracy need not 
themselves be illegal,” United States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 200 (3d Cir. 1980), and it 
is therefore immaterial whether Katzin could have been convicted of attempted burglary, 
as a stand-alone offense, based on the Feasterville evidence.  Given our standard of 
review, this verdict was supported by sufficient evidence: it rises above the level of bare 
rationality.    
IV. EXPERT TESTIMONY 
 The District Court excluded Defendant’s expert testimony in its entirety for the 
defense’s failure to comply with Rules 12.2 and 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.  We review for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Scott, 223 F.3d 208, 211 
(3d Cir. 2000).  Rule 12.2(b) provides that: 
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If a defendant intends to introduce expert evidence relating to a mental 
disease or defect or any other mental condition of the defendant bearing on 
either (1) the issue of guilt or (2) the issue of punishment in a capital case, 
the defendant must--within the time provided for filing a pretrial motion or 
at any later time the court sets--notify an attorney for the government in 
writing of this intention and file a copy of the notice with the clerk. The 
court may, for good cause, allow the defendant to file the notice late, grant 
the parties additional trial-preparation time, or make other appropriate 
orders. 
Rule 16(b)(1)(C)(ii) provides further that the defense must, if requested, give the 
government a summary of expert testimony if the defense intends to present expert 
testimony under Rule 12.2(b).  
 The defense first argues, without support, that Rule 12.2(b) does not apply to a 
voluntary intoxication defense.  However, intoxication would appear to be a “mental 
condition” pursuant to the plain text of the Rule.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2(b).  Moreover, the 
notes to Rule 12.2 make clear that mental condition is to be applied to any of a “wide 
variety of circumstances” where the government would need notice to effectively rebut 
and cross-examine the defense’s expert witnesses.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2, Advisory 
Committee’s Note to 1983 Amendment.  This reasoning applies to this intoxication 
defense.  Indeed, the notes approvingly cite the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in United States 
v. Olson, 576 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1978), which applied Rule 12.2 to testimony about 
alcohol’s effect on the defendant’s mental capacity.  The Second Circuit has also applied 
Rule 12.2(b) to the voluntary intoxication defense, specifically.  United States v. 
Cervone, 907 F.2d 332, 345-46 (2d Cir. 1990).  Thus, the Rule is applicable.   
 The defense next argues that, if the Rule applies, the District Court abused its 
discretion in excluding the testimony in its entirety.  It argues, essentially, that the 
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defense notified the government of its expert testimony as early as it could have, on the 
basis that Katzin had no reason to tell counsel that he had slept through the robbery until 
after the GPS issues in this case had been fully resolved.  Even if we accepted that Katzin 
need not have raised this issue by the first deadline for pretrial motions, in 2011, 
however, this does not excuse his failure to meet the August 7, 2015 deadline, after all 
appellate proceedings had concluded.  The defense first notified the government of its 
intent to introduce this expert testimony on December 28, 2015, and provided the 
government with its expert report on New Year’s Eve.  The District Court was well 
within its discretion to exclude this evidence.  See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 
F.2d 619, 627-29 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding no abuse of discretion where notice of intent 
filed three working days before trial and noting that attorney should have investigated 
case to determine if insanity defense would be presented).   
V. SENTENCING  
 When reviewing sentencing adjustments pursuant to § 3C1.1 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, we review the district court’s factual determinations of willful obstruction of 
justice for clear error, while its legal interpretations are subject to plenary review.  United 
States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 200 (3d Cir. 2003).  To preserve an issue for appeal and 
avoid plain error review, a defendant “must raise any procedural objection to his sentence 
at the time the procedural error is made.”  United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 
256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 Katzin raises two challenges to the imposition of the obstruction of justice 
adjustment: first, that the adjustment was improperly imposed based on his dilatory 
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behavior with respect to his expert materials and “sleeping” defense, as discussed above; 
and second, that if the adjustment was imposed based on perjurious statements, then the 
District Court failed to make the requisite findings.   
 While the District Court was clearly perturbed by Katzin’s late disclosures, it also 
based its sentencing decision, at least in part, on its determination that Katzin committed 
perjury.  See, e.g., App. 1289a (Court observing that if people “get up on the stand and 
come up with something that was so clearly not believable,” then “[t]hat to me does raise 
the possible appropriateness of the adjustment.”).  This provides an adequate basis for the 
imposition of the enhancement.2   
Nor did the District Court clearly err in finding perjury here.  “A defendant who 
testifies under oath at trial commits perjury within § 3C1.1 if he ‘gives false testimony 
concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than 
as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.’”  United States v. Napolitan, 762 
F.3d 297, 312 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 
(1993)).  The District Court had a sufficient basis to conclude that Katzin met this 
standard.  Based on its conviction, the jury necessarily found that Katzin’s statement that 
he slept through the burglary and was unaware of it was false—and this was a central 
                                              
2 The District Court’s consternation with Appellant’s failure to provide notice of his 
defense with alacrity is certainly warranted.  It is not clear, however, whether that 
provides a legal basis for imposing a sentencing enhancement pursuant to § 3C1.1, as the 
District Court did, in part.  See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 Commentary, Notes 4-5.  However, we 
need not reach this question, for “we can affirm on any basis appearing in the record.”  
Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Because the record supports the District Court’s finding of perjury, there is a 
separate and independent basis for applying § 3C1.1.   
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issue in his case.  This is supported by evidence, for example, that Katzin did not appear 
intoxicated at the time of arrest and telephone records showing that Mark Katzin 
repeatedly called Michael Katzin’s cell phone during the trial, App. 781-89.  Nor is there 
any indication (or argument by Appellant) that Michael Katzin’s false testimony 
stemmed from confusion or mistake. 
As for the lack of findings, it is true that where a defendant has objected to a 
sentence enhancement based on trial testimony, as here, “a district court must review the 
evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or 
obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same, under the perjury definition we have 
set out.”  Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 95.  It is “preferable” for the district court to address 
each finding separately and clearly, but it is sufficient for the court to make a finding that 
“encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury.”  Id.  The District 
Court failed to make such findings here.  App. 1295a.  However, the defense did not 
object to this failure during sentencing, so we review only for plain error.  An error is 
plain if it is “clear” or “obvious,” is prejudicial, and “affects the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 259.  We have 
excused a district court’s failure to expressly make perjury findings where the relevant 
determinations are “implicit in the district court’s reasoning” and “clear from our 
independent review of the record.”  United States v. Boggi, 74 F.3d 470, 479 (3d Cir. 
1996).  Thus, given the strictures of plain error review, we do not find plain error here.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Because we find no reversible error in the District Court’s treatment of the 
conspiracy charges, its evidentiary decisions, or its sentencing, we will affirm.   
